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5 October 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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5 October 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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\*East Germany - Berlin: Ulbricht's statement before the East German Volkskammer on 4 October strongly emphasized East Germany's claims to "sovereignty" over East Berlin and its demand for the establishment of a "free city" of West Berlin. He gave no indication of what countermeasures the East German regime intends to take to offset Bonn's announcement of its cancellation of the East-West German interzonal trade agreement. He did, however, propose holding trade talks with West Germany but under such unacceptable preconditions as the repudiation by Bonn of its Hallstein Doctrine--the West German policy of breaking relations with any nonbloc country which accords diplomatic recognition to East Germany. Ulbricht may believe that Western businessmen and neutralists will tend to undermine future moves by Bonn to limit trade. Ulbricht's cautious attitude may indicate that specific countermoves must wait while Khrushchev is preoccupied with the General Assembly meeting.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Afghanistan-Pakistan: Fighting among the Pushtoon tribes living along the Afghan-Pakistani border north of the Khyber Pass now appears to be slackening. Despite the continuing exchange of recriminations, Kabul, as well as Rawalpindi, now seems to want to keep the disturbance localized. Afghan Prime Minister Daud, however, originally concentrated forces along the border to exploit unrest on the Pakistani side, and he will lose prestige among the Pushtoon tribes if he demobilizes and withdraws with no apparent achievement. Accordingly, Pakistan continues to strengthen its forces near the scene of the fighting in the event Afghanistan decides to increase its intervention.

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\*Laos: The Communist Pathet Lao seem intent on re-  
taining control of Sam Neua Province as a bargaining  
counter in the impending negotiations with the Laotian  
Government. A two-man delegation sent by Premier Sou-  
vanna to negotiate with the Pathet Lao for restoration of  
the government's authority in the province returned to  
Vientiane empty-handed on 3 October. The Pathet Lao  
radio is reported to have announced that the government  
would not be permitted to send administrators to the prov-  
ince until negotiations have been held. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Page 3)

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### Fighting on Afghan-Pakistani Border Slackens

Fighting among the Pushtoon tribes living along the Afghan-Pakistani border north of the Khyber Pass appears to be slackening. Despite a continuing exchange of recriminations, Kabul as well as Rawalpindi now seems to want to keep the disturbance localized. [redacted] the Afghan Government has begun to disband some of the tribal irregulars it recruited in early September when the fighting began.

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Afghan Prime Minister Daud apparently was surprised that more Pushtoon tribes on the Pakistani side of the border did not join with the Afghan tribal irregulars who had crossed into Pakistan to help defeat the progovernment Khan of Khar but that, on the contrary, the local tribes repulsed the Afghan irregulars. As a result, he is probably reassessing the value of his Pushtoonistan propaganda campaign and his capability to stir up trouble among the Pakistani tribes.

In view of the fact that Daud originally took the initiative by sending the irregulars across the border, by calling up reserves, and by concentrating regular army forces at the border to exploit unrest on the Pakistani side, he would lose prestige among the powerful Pushtoon tribes if he demobilized and withdrew with no apparent gain. Accordingly, Pakistan continues to strengthen its forces near the scene of the fighting to be ready to respond should Afghanistan decide to increase its intervention.

Meanwhile, partly as a result of the frontier disturbance, Daud faces new problems at home; reservists are reportedly continuing to desert; food prices in Kabul have risen sharply following government purchases to feed the reserves; and an outbreak of cholera is further disrupting the life of the city. Afghan police have conducted a systematic search for arms through the Kabul bazaars. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] the two cabinet ministers sent by Premier Souvanna Phouma to Sam Neua Province were unable to negotiate with the Pathet Lao on the restoration of the government's authority in the province. [redacted] the local Pathet Lao commanders refused to talk to them on the ground that they had received no instructions from the high command. The Pathet Lao radio, meanwhile, is quoted by press sources to the effect that no government administrators would be permitted to enter Sam Neua until negotiations for an overall settlement had been undertaken, thus strengthening the impression that the Pathet Lao will retain control of the province as a bargaining counter.

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Captain Kong Le, at a 4 October rally in Vientiane organized by the leftist Youth party, reiterated his boast that he could take General Phoumi's base at Savannakhet. While there has been no independent confirmation of Phoumi's claim that Kong Le's forces resumed their offensive against Phoumi's troops southeast of Paksane, Kong Le clearly is anxious to press on against Phoumi. The reported demand of the participants at the rally for action against the Phoumi group may be all the encouragement Kong Le needs to resume his offensive, if indeed he has not already done so.

Souvanna, in addressing the same rally, announced that he expected to contact an advance Pathet Lao delegation in a day or two and that he would open peace talks with Prince Souphannouvong soon afterward. The premier may have exaggerated the imminence of these talks in order to appease and gain control of the rally; however, the possibility cannot be excluded that Souvanna intends to move as rapidly as possible in implementing his program, thus presenting the King and any compromise government which might succeed him the fait accompli of a negotiated settlement with the Pathet Lao.

[redacted] Three hundred infantry troops from the Luang Prabang area have reportedly arrived in Vientiane, increasing the number of troops available to Ouane who are not responsive to Kong Le's direction. Their commander claims that he could cause some of Kong Le's troops to defect and believes he could defeat Kong Le in any fight. It remains questionable, however, whether Ouane has either the willingness or the temerity to seek a showdown with Kong Le. [redacted]

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